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Abstract
We adopt the perspective of an aggregator, which seeks to coordinate its pur-
chase of demand reductions from a fixed group of residential electricity cus-
tomers, with its sale of the aggregate demand reduction in a two-settlement
wholesale energy market. The aggregator procures reductions in demand by
offering its customers a uniform price for reductions in consumption relative
to their predetermined baselines. Prior to its realization of the aggregate
demand reduction, the aggregator must also determine how much energy to
sell into the two-settlement energy market. In the day-ahead market, the
aggregator commits to a forward contract, which calls for the delivery of en-
ergy in the real-time market. The underlying aggregate demand curve, which
relates the aggregate demand reduction to the aggregator’s offered price, is
assumed to be affine and subject to unobservable, random shocks. Assuming
that both the parameters of the demand curve and the distribution of the
random shocks are initially unknown to the aggregator, we investigate the
extent to which the aggregator might dynamically adapt its offered prices
and forward contracts to maximize its expected profit over a time window of
T days. Specifically, we design a dynamic pricing and contract offering policy
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that resolves the aggregator’s need to learn the unknown demand model with
its desire to maximize its cumulative expected profit over time. In particular,
the proposed pricing policy is proven to incur a regret over T days that is no
greater than O(log(T )
√
T ).
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1. Introduction
The large scale utilization of demand response (DR) resources has the
potential to substantially improve the reliability and efficiency of electric
power systems. Accordingly, several state and federal mandates have been
established to facilitate the integration of demand response resources into
wholesale electricity markets. For example, FERC Order 719 mandates that
Independent System Operators (ISOs) permit the direct sale of energy pro-
duced by DR resources into wholesale electricity markets [2]. However, as
individual residential customers often posses insufficient capacity to partici-
pate in such markets directly, there emerges the need for an intermediary, or
aggregator, with the ability to coordinate the demand response of large num-
bers of residential customers for direct sale into the wholesale electricity mar-
ket. Such is consistent with the growing multitude of ISO and utility-run DR
programs, which require that aggregated DR resources have a minimum load
curtailment capability. For example, the Proxy Demand Resource (PDR)
program operated by the California ISO has minimum capacity requirement
of 100 kW, while the Day-Ahead Demand Response Program (DADRP) op-
erated by the New York ISO has a more stringent capacity requirement of
one MW.
In this paper, we adopt the perspective of an aggregator, which seeks
to coordinate its purchase of an aggregate demand reduction from a fixed
group of residential electricity customers, with its sale of the aggregate de-
mand reduction into a two-settlement wholesale energy market.1 Formally,
this amounts to a two-sided optimization problem, which requires the aggre-
gator to balance the cost it incurs in procuring a reduction in demand from
1From the perspective of the wholesale electricity market, the provisioning of a mea-
surable reduction in demand from an aggregator is equivalent to an increase in supply.
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participating customers against the revenue it derives from its sale of the (a
priori uncertain) demand reduction into the wholesale energy market.
More specifically, we consider the setting in which the aggregator pur-
chases demand reductions from its customers using a non-discriminatory,
posted price mechanism. That is to say, each participating customer is payed
for her reduction in electricity demand according to a uniform per-unit en-
ergy price determined by the aggregator. Pricing mechanisms of this form
fall within the more general category of DR programs that rely on peak time
rebates (PTR) as incentives for demand reduction. Prior to its realization
of the aggregate demand reduction, the aggregator must also determine how
much energy to sell into the two-settlement energy market. In the day-ahead
(DA) market, the aggregator commits to a forward energy contract, which
calls for delivery of the contracted energy in the real-time (RT) market. If the
realized reduction in demand exceeds (falls short of) the forward contract,
then the difference is sold (bought) in the RT market. Therefore, in order to
maximize its profit, the aggregator must co-optimize the DR price it offers
its customers with the forward contract that it commits to in the wholesale
energy market, as the former determines its ability to deliver the latter.
There are a variety of challenges that the aggregator faces in operating
such DR programs. The most basic challenge is the prediction of how cus-
tomers will adjust their aggregate demand in response to different DR prices,
i.e., the aggregate demand curve. If the offered price is too low, consumers
may be unwilling to curtail their demand; if the offered price is too high, the
aggregator pays too much and gets more reduction than is needed. As the
aggregator is initially ignorant to the customers’ aggregate demand curve,
the aggregator must attempt to learn a model of customer behavior over
time through repeated observations of demand reductions in response to the
DR prices that it offers. Simultaneously, the aggregator must jointly adjust
its DR prices and forward contract offerings in such a manner as to facilitate
profit maximization over time. As we will later show, such tasks are inti-
mately related, and give rise to a fundamental trade-off between the need to
learn (explore) and earn (exploit).
Contribution: In this paper, we study the setting in which the aggregator
is faced with an aggregate demand curve that is affine in price, and subject
to unobservable, additive random shocks. We assume that both the param-
eters of the demand curve and the probability distribution of the random
shocks are fixed, but initially unknown to the aggregator. Faced with such
ignorance, we explore the extent to which the aggregator might dynamically
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adapt its posted DR prices and offered contracts to maximize its expected
profit over a time frame of T days. Specifically, we design a causal pricing
and contract offering policy that resolves the aggregator’s need to learn the
unknown demand model with its desire to maximize its cumulative expected
profit over time. The proposed pricing policy is proven to exhibit regret (rel-
ative to an oracle) over T days that is at most O(log(T )
√
T ). In addition,
the proposed policy is proven to generate a sequence of posted DR prices and
forward contracts that converge to the oracle optimal DR price and forward
contract in the mean square sense.
Related Work: There is a large body of literature in power systems
concerned with the aggregation and coordination of flexible demand-side re-
sources to optimize certain economic objectives that an aggregator might
encounter in wholesale energy or ancillary service markets. In such set-
tings, the aggregator will typically exercise control over the consumption
of participating demand-side resources using either (1) a direct load con-
trol mechanism whereby the aggregator can directly regulate the consump-
tion of participating load resources according to a pre-specified contract
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]; or (2) an indirect load control mechanism
whereby customers adjust their load in response to price signals or incentives
offered by the aggregator (e.g., time-of-use pricing, peak time rebates, etc.)
[14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
The literature—as it relates to the problem of co-optimizing an aggrega-
tor’s (two-sided) transactions between end-use customers and the wholesale
market—is much less developed. Campaigne et al. [22] consider a two-sided
market model that is perhaps closest in nature to the one considered in this
paper. Specifically, the authors adopt a mechanism design approach to the
procurement of load reductions from customers, where customers are rationed
and remunerated according to their self-reported types.2 In this paper, we
adopt a posted price approach to the procurement of demand reductions from
customers. This is in sharp contrast to the mechanism design approach of
[22], as it gives rise to the need to learn customers’ types (i.e., demand func-
tions) over time from measured data. From a practical standpoint, there are
a variety of reasons as to why a posted price approach might be preferable
2We refer the reader to [23, 24] for a related line of literature, which also employs a
mechanism design approach to the procurement of demand reductions in such two-sided
markets.
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to the mechanism design approach advocated by Campaigne et al. [22], not
the least of which pertains to the simplicity and ease of implementation of
posted pricing schemes. We refer the reader to [25] for a detailed discussion
surrounding the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach in the
context of online marketplaces. To the best of our knowledge, this paper
is the first to analyze the use of a posted pricing scheme by an aggregator
participating in such two-sided markets.
Organization: The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we formulate the aggregator’s profit maximization problem. In
Section 3, we propose a recursive estimation scheme to facilitate the online
learning of the unknown demand model. In Section 4, we propose an adaptive
pricing and contract offering policy for the aggregator, and provide a theoret-
ical analysis that establishes a sublinear growth rate of the regret incurred by
the policy. In Section 5, we illustrate the performance of our proposed policy
with a numerical case study. A table listing the pertinent notation used in
this paper can be found in the Appendix to the paper. Detailed proofs of all
formal results can be found in the Appendix to the paper.
2. Model
We adopt the perspective of an aggregator who seeks to purchase demand
reductions from a fixed group of N customers for sale into a two-settlement
wholesale energy market. The market is assumed to repeat over multiple time
periods (e.g., days) indexed by t = 1, 2, . . .. The actions taken by the both
aggregator and customers are described in detail in the following subsections,
and concisely summarized in Table 1.
2.1. Two-Settlement Market Model
At the beginning of each day t, the aggregator commits to a forward con-
tract for energy in the day-ahead (DA) market in the amount of Qt (kWh).
The forward contract is remunerated at the DA energy price. The forward
contract calls for delivery in the real-time (RT) market. If the energy deliv-
ered by the aggregator (i.e., the aggregate demand reduction) falls short of
the forward contract, the aggregator must purchase the shortfall in the RT
market at the shortage price. If the energy delivered exceeds the forward
contract, the aggregator must sell the excess supply in the RT market at the
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overage price.3 Naturally, the wholesale energy prices will vary from day to
day. We denote the wholesale energy prices (measured in $/kWh) on day t
by:
• pit, DA energy price,
• pi−t , RT shortage price,
• pi+t , RT overage price.
We make several standard assumptions regarding the aggregator’s actions
and the determination of energy prices in the wholesale market. First, we
assume that the aggregator’s maximum demand curtailment capacity is small
relative to the total volume of the DA energy market. Under this assumption,
it is reasonable to assume that the aggregator cannot appreciably affect price.
Accordingly, we assume that the aggregator behaves as a price taker in the
DA energy market, and model the DA energy price pit as fixed and known at
the outset of each period t. Second, as the RT imbalance prices (pi−t , pi
+
t ) are
not known to the aggregator at the time of committing to a forward contract
in the DA market, we model them as random variables whose expected values
are denoted by
µ− := E[pi−t ] and µ
+ := E[pi+t ]
for each period t. Note that while we allow the RT imbalance price real-
izations to vary across time, we require that their expected values be time
invariant. We make the following technical assumption in a similar manner
to [22].
Assumption 1. The DA energy price satisfies pit > 0 and µ
+ < pit < µ
− on
each day t.
Assumption 1 serves to facilitate clarity of exposition and analysis in the
sequel, as it will preserve the concavity of the aggregator’s expected profit
function (2). Moreover, this assumption eliminates the possibility of perverse
market outcomes in which the aggregator offers forward energy contracts with
the explicit intention of deviating from the contract in the RT market.
3We note that this two-settlement market structure reflects existing market rules, which
govern the behavior of aggregators in a variety of DR programs in operation today—
including the day-ahead demand response program (DADRP) and the proxy demand
resource (PDR) program administered by the New York ISO and the California ISO,
respectively.
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Actor(s) Decision Description
Aggregator Qt In the day-ahead (DA) market on day t, the
aggergrator commits to a forward energy contract
Qt, which calls for delivery over pre-specified
interval of time in the real-time (RT) market.
Aggregator pt Prior to delivery in the RT market, the aggregator
broadcasts a uniform price pt for demand reduction
to all customers participating in the DR program.
Customers Dt In the RT market, participating customers respond
to the aggregator’s offered price pt by reducing
their aggregate demand by an amount Dt.
Table 1: Description and timing of actions taken by the aggregator and customers.
2.2. Demand Response Model
In order to fulfill its forward contract commitment Qt on day t, the ag-
gregator must elicit an aggregate reduction in demand from its customers.
It does so by broadcasting a uniform DR price pt ≥ 0, to which each cus-
tomer i responds with a reduction in demand in the amount of Dit (kWh),
thereby entitling each customer i to receive a payment of ptDit. We note
that implicit in this model is the assumption that each customer’s reduction
in demand is measured against a predetermined baseline. The question as to
how to accurately estimate baseline demand is a challenging and active area
of research [26, 27, 28, 29]. The generalization of our model to accommodate
the endogenous estimation of a priori uncertain customer baselines is left as
a direction for future research.
We model the response of each customer i to the posted price pt at time
t according to the affine function
Dit = aipt + bi + εit, for i = 1, . . . , N,
where ai ∈ R and bi ∈ R are customer i’s idiosyncratic demand model
parameters, and εit is an unobservable demand shock, which we model as
a zero-mean random variable. We assume that both the model parameters
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ai and bi, and the probability distribution function of the demand shock are
initially unknown to the aggregator. Clearly, the aggregate demand reduction
Dt :=
∑N
i=1Dit satisfies the affine relationship
Dt = apt + b+ εt, (1)
where the aggregate demand model parameters and shock are defined as
a :=
∑N
i=1 ai, b :=
∑N
i=1 bi, and εt :=
∑N
i=1 εit, respectively. In the sequel, we
will occasionally denote the tuple of aggregate demand parameters according
to θ := (a, b).
We assume throughout the paper that a ∈ [a, a] and b ∈ [0, b], where
the parameter bounds a, a, and b are assumed to be known and satisfy
0 < a ≤ a < ∞ and 0 ≤ b < ∞. Such assumptions are natural, as they en-
sure a bounded and positive price elasticity of aggregate demand, and that
reductions in aggregate demand are guaranteed to be nonnegative in the
absence of demand shocks. In addition to the following technical assump-
tion, we also assume that the sequence of aggregate demand shocks {εt} are
independent and identically distributed (IID) random variables, which are
mutually independent from the RT imbalance prices {pi+t } and {pi−t }.
Assumption 2. The aggregate demand shock εt takes values in the interval
[ε, ε]. Moreover, its cumulative distribution function F is bi-Lipschitz over
this range. Namely, there exists a real constant L ≥ 1, such that for all
x, y ∈ [ε, ε], it holds that
1
L
|x− y| ≤ |F (x)− F (y)| ≤ L |x− y| .
The assumption that the aggregate demand shock takes bounded values is
natural, given the physical limitation on the range of values that demand
can take. We also note that we do not require the aggregator to have ex-
plicit knowledge of the parameters specified in Assumption 2 beyond the
assumption of their boundedness.
2.3. Aggregator Profit
The expected profit derived by the aggregator during period t given a
fixed forward contract Qt and price pt is determined by
rt(Qt, pt) := pitQt + E
[
pi+t [Dt −Qt]+ − pi−t [Qt −Dt]+ − ptDt
]
,
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where [x]+ := max{0, x} for all x ∈ R. Given our previous assumption that
the demand shocks {εt} are mutually independent from the RT imbalance
prices {pi+t } and {pi−t }, the expected profit function simplifies to
rt(Qt, pt) = pitQt + µ
+
E
[
[Dt −Qt]+
]− µ−E [[Qt −Dt]+]− E [ptDt] . (2)
Here, expectation is taken with respect to the random demand shock εt.
We define the oracle optimal contract and price as
(Q∗t , p
∗
t ) := argmax{rt(Q, p) : (Q, p) ∈ R2}. (3)
That is to say, (Q∗t , p
∗
t ) denote the forward contract and DR price, which
jointly maximize the aggregator’s expected profit on day t given perfect
knowledge of the demand model. It is straightforward to calculate the oracle
optimal contract and price from the first-order optimality condition associ-
ated with problem (3), as the expected profit criterion (2) is guaranteed to be
jointly concave in its arguments (Qt, pt) given that satisfaction of Assump-
tion 1. The closed-form expressions for the oracle optimal contract and price
are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Oracle Optimal Policy). For each period t ≥ 1, the oracle
optimal contract Q∗t and price p
∗
t are given by
Q∗t =
1
2
(apit + b) + F
−1(αt), (4)
p∗t =
1
2
(
pit − b
a
)
, (5)
where
αt :=
pit − µ+
µ− − µ+ .
Here, F−1(αt) := inf{x ∈ R : F (x) ≥ αt} denotes the αt-quantile of the
random demand shock εt. Assumption 1 ensures that the price ratio αt is
a valid probability, i.e., αt ∈ (0, 1). It is also worth noting that the oracle
optimal contract can be equivalently rewritten as Q∗t = ap
∗
t + b+F
−1(αt). It
follows that Q∗t can be interpreted as the maximum demand reduction that
the aggregator is guaranteed to receive with probability at least 1−αt under
the oracle optimal price p∗t .
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Remark 1 (Supply Function Offer). The oracle optimal contract Q∗t can
be equivalently interpreted as a supply function offer in the DA market, indi-
cating the maximum amount of energy that the aggregator is willing to supply
at a given price pit. In particular, it is not difficult to show that the oracle
optimal contract Q∗t is a monotone, non-decreasing function in the DA price
pit. Of primary importance to this interpretation is the assumption that the
aggregator behaves as a price taker in the DA market—ensuring that it wields
no influence over the DA market price.
We define the oracle optimal profit accumulated over T time periods as
R∗(T ) :=
T∑
t=1
rt(Q
∗
t , p
∗
t ).
We employ the term oracle, as R∗(T ) equals the maximum expected profit
that an aggregator might derive over T times periods if it had perfect knowl-
edge of the demand model at the outset.
2.4. Policy Design and Regret
We consider the scenario in which the aggregator knows neither the de-
mand model parameter θ = (a, b) nor the aggregate shock distribution F at
the outset. Accordingly, the aggregator must endeavor to learn these features
from the data that it collects over time, e.g., through online assimilation of
measurements of aggregate demand reductions in response to its posted DR
prices. At the same time, the aggregator must dynamically adapt its se-
quence of posted DR prices (and forward contract offerings) to improve its
profit over time. In what follows, we describe the space of feasible policies
that the aggregator might use to guide its adaptation of contracts {Qt} and
DR prices {pt} over time.
Prior to its determination of the contract Qt and the price pt at time
t, the aggregator has access to the entire history of prices, contract of-
ferings, and aggregate demand reductions, up to and including time pe-
riod t − 1. We define a feasible policy as an infinite sequence of functions
γ := ((Q1, p1), (Q2, p2), . . .), where each function in the sequence is allowed
to depend only on the past data available until that point in time. More for-
mally, we require that the functions (Qt, pt) be measurable according to the
σ-algebra generated by the history of offered contracts, prices, and demand
observations, i.e.,
(Q1, . . . , Qt−1, p1, . . . , pt−1, D1, . . . , Dt−1)
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for all time periods t ≥ 2. For the initial time period t = 1, we require that
(Q1, p1) be a pair of deterministic constants, as the aggregator has yet to
collect any information about demand.
The expected profit generated by a feasible policy γ over T time periods
is defined as
Rγ(T ) := Eγ
[
T∑
t=1
rt(Qt, pt)
]
, (6)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the demand model (1) under
the policy γ. We measure the performance of a feasible policy γ over T time
periods according to the T -period regret, which is defined as
∆γ(T ) := R∗(T )− Rγ(T ).
The T -period regret incurred by a feasible policy equals the difference be-
tween the oracle optimal profit and the expected profit incurred by that
policy over T time periods. Clearly, policies that produce low regret are
preferred, as the oracle optimal profit is an upper bound on the maximum
expected profit achievable by any feasible policy. Accordingly, we seek the
design of policies whose T -period regret grows sublinearly with the horizon
T . Such policies are said to have no-regret in the long run, as their average
regret (1/T ) ·∆γ(T ) is guaranteed to vanish asymptotically. More formally,
we have the following definition.
Definition 1 (No-Regret Policy). A feasible policy γ is said to have no-
regret if limT→∞∆
γ(T )/T = 0.
The following result establishes an upper bound on the T -period regret
in terms of the pricing and contract errors relative to their oracle optimal
counterparts. Lemma 2 will prove useful to the derivation of our main results.
Lemma 2. The T -period regret incurred by any feasible policy γ is upper
bounded by
∆γ(T ) ≤ a
T∑
t=1
E
γ
[
(pt − p∗t )2
]
+ L(µ− − µ+)
T∑
t=1
E
γ
[
(Qt −Q∗t − a(pt − p∗t ))2
]
,
(7)
where (Q∗t , p
∗
t ) denote the oracle optimal contract and price at time t.
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Lemma 2 reveals that convergence of the offered contracts and posted prices
to their oracle optimal counterparts (in the mean square sense) will prove
essential to the design of policies that exhibit no-regret. In the following
section, we introduce a simple method for demand model learning based on
least-squares estimation that will facilitate the design of such policies.
3. Demand Model Learning
In this section, we propose a simple approach to enable the dynamic
learning of the underlying demand model from data using the method of
least squares estimation.
3.1. Parameter Estimation
We define the least squares estimator (LSE) of the parameter θ, given the
history of past prices and demand observations through time period t as
θt := argmin
{
t∑
k=1
(Dk − (ϑ1pk + ϑ2))2 : (ϑ1, ϑ2) ∈ R2
}
,
for time periods t = 2, 3, . . .. The LSE is given by
θt = P
−1
t
(
t∑
k=1
[
pk
1
]
Dk
)
, (8)
assuming that the indicated inverse exists. The matrix Pt is defined as
Pt :=
t∑
k=1
[
pk
1
] [
pk
1
]⊤
.
Its inverse is given by
P−1t =
1
t2Vt
(
t∑
k=1
[−1
pk
] [−1
pk
]⊤)
, (9)
where Vt := (1/t)
∑t
k=1(pk−p¯t)2 denotes the sample variance associated with
the sequence of posted prices through time period t, and p¯t := (1/t)
∑t
k=1 pk
12
denotes their sample mean. The parameter estimation error that results
under the LSE (8) can be expressed as
θt − θ = P−1t
(
t∑
k=1
[
pk
1
]
εk
)
. (10)
The expression for the parameter estimation error in (10) hints at a depen-
dency between the rate at which the parameter estimation error converges to
zero, and the rate at which the variance in the underlying sequence of posted
prices grows (or decays) over time. In Section 4, we leverage on this insight
to design a pricing policy that generates enough variance in the sequence of
posted prices to ensure convergence of the sequence of parameter estimates
to the true parameters in the mean square sense.
We close this section by recalling our previous assumption that the un-
known parameter θ belongs to a closed and compact set given by Θ :=
[a, a] × [0, b]. Using this assumption, one can improve upon the LSE (8)
by projecting θt onto the set Θ. More precisely, define the truncated least
squares estimator (TLSE) as
θ̂t := argmin {‖ϑ− θt‖2 : ϑ ∈ Θ} . (11)
It clearly holds that ‖θ̂t − θ‖ ≤ ‖θt − θ‖, i.e., the TLSE is no worse than the
LSE.
3.2. Quantile Estimation
We propose an approach to the recursive estimation of the unknown quan-
tile function using the estimation residuals generated by the truncated LSE
(11). At each time t, define the sequence of residuals associated with the
estimator θ̂t as
ε̂k,t := Dk − (âtpk + b̂t), for k = 1, . . . , t. (12)
Define their empirical distribution function as
F̂t(x) :=
1
t
t∑
k=1
1{ε̂k,t ≤ x},
and their corresponding empirical quantile function as F̂−1t (α) := inf{x ∈ R :
F̂t(x) ≥ α} for all α ∈ (0, 1). It will prove useful to the subsequent analyses
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to express the empirical quantile function in terms of the order statistics
associated with the sequence of residuals. The order statistics associated
with the sequence ε̂1,t, . . . , ε̂t,t are defined as a permutation of the sequence
denoted by ε̂(1),t, . . . , ε̂(t),t, where
ε̂(1),t ≤ ε̂(2),t ≤ . . . ≤ ε̂(t),t.
With the order statistics of the residuals in hand, one can express the em-
pirical quantile function as
F̂−1t (α) = ε̂(i),t, (13)
where i is the unique index that satisfies i − 1 < tα ≤ i. It is not difficult
to show that this index is given by i = ⌈tα⌉. Using Equation (13), the
quantile estimation error can be linked to the parameter estimation error via
the following inequality,
|F̂−1t (α)− F−1(α)| ≤ |F−1t (α)− F−1(α)|+
√
1 + p2(i)‖θ̂t − θ‖, (14)
where F−1t is defined as the empirical quantile function associated with se-
quence of demand shocks ε1, . . . , εt.
It follows from the inequality in (14) that consistency of the quantile es-
timator (13) depends on consistency of both the parameter estimator θ̂t and
the empirical quantile function F−1t . We establish consistency of the parame-
ter estimator under our proposed policy in Lemma 3. Clearly, consistency of
the empirical quantile function F−1t does not depend on the particular policy
being used. In Proposition 1, we establish a bound on the rate at which the
sequence of functions {F−1t } converges pointwise in probability to F−1 on
the interval (0, 1).
Proposition 1. There exists a finite positive constant µ1 such that
P{|F−1t (α)− F−1(α)| > δ} ≤ 2 exp(−µ1δ2t) (15)
for all α ∈ (0, 1), δ > 0, and t ≥ 2.
We omit a formal proof of Proposition 1, as it can be obtained as a direct
consequence of Lemma 2 in [30] using Assumption 2 in this paper.
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4. Learning to Buy and Sell with No-Regret
In what follows, we build on the approach to demand model learning
outlined in Section 3 to construct a pricing and contract offering policy, which
is guaranteed to exhibit no-regret. In doing so, we establish in Theorem 1 a
O(log(T )
√
T ) upper bound on the T -period regret incurred under the policy
that we propose.
4.1. Myopic Policy (MP)
We first introduce a natural approach to pricing and contract offering,
which combines the model learning scheme outlined in Section 3 with a nat-
ural, albeit myopic, approach to pricing and contract offering. That is to say,
at each time period t, the aggregator estimates the demand model parame-
ters and quantile function according to θ̂t−1 and F̂
−1
t−1(α) defined in (11) and
(13), respectively, and sets the forward contract and price according to
Q̂t =
1
2
(
ât−1pit + b̂t−1
)
+ F̂−1t−1(αt), (16)
p̂t =
1
2
(
pit − b̂t−1
ât−1
)
. (17)
Under this myopic policy,4 the aggregator treats its demand model estimates
in each period as if they were correct, and ignores the impact that its choice
of price might have on its ability to accurately estimate the demand model in
future time periods. As discussed in Section 3.1, consistency of the param-
eter estimator is reliant upon sufficient variance in the underlying sequence
of prices. However, under the myopic policy the sequence of prices may
converge prematurely to a fixed price, which differs from the oracle opti-
mal price. As a consequence, the sequence of parameter estimates may also
converge to a value that is different from the true model parameter. This
phenomenon—also known as incomplete learning—is well-documented in the
adaptive control literature [31, 32, 33] and the revenue management litera-
ture [34, 35]. In Section 5, we conduct a numerical case study, which suggests
the occurrence of incomplete learning under the myopic policy. We refer the
reader to Figure 1(c) for a graphical illustration of incomplete learning under
the myopic policy.
4It is worth noting that, in the adaptive control theory literature, such myopic policies
are more commonly known as certainty equivalent policies.
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4.2. Randomly Perturbed Myopic Policy (RPMP)
To prevent the occurrence of incomplete learning, we propose a novel
policy that is guaranteed to generate adequate price dispersion through ap-
plication of random perturbations to the myopic policy. We refer to this
policy as the randomly perturbed myopic policy (RPMP). We initialize the
RPMP with a deterministic choice of prices and contracts for periods one and
two p1, Q1, p2, and Q2, respectively, such that p1 6= p2.5 For all subsequent
time periods t ≥ 3, the RPMP sets prices and contracts according to:
Qt = Q̂t, (18)
pt =
{
p̂t, if ξt = 0,
p¯t−1 + ρ, if ξt = 1,
(19)
where p¯t−1 =
1
t−1
∑t−1
k=1 pk denotes the sample mean of the posted price his-
tory. Here,
ξt ∼ Ber(ηt−r)
defines a sequence of independent Bernoulli random variables with probabil-
ities P{ξt = 1} = ηt−r. The parameters η ∈ (0, 1], ρ ∈ (0,∞), and r ∈ [0,∞)
are user specified constants. The parameter η determines, in part, the proba-
bility that a price perturbation is applied at any given time period, while the
parameter ρ determines the magnitude of this perturbation. In this paper,
we allow the parameters η and ρ to be arbitrary, and investigate the role that
the parameter r plays in controlling the rate at which the perturbation prob-
ability decays over time. We refer the reader to the discussion immediately
following Lemma 3 for a precise explanation of the role that the parameter
r plays in controlling the degree to which the randomly perturbed myopic
policy (RPMP) balances exploration versus exploitation. It also important to
note that although the parameters η and ρ play a role in determining the per-
formance of the randomly perturbed myopic policy (RPMP) in finite-time,
they do not affect asymptotic performance of the policy, i.e., the asymptotic
order of regret incurred under the RPMP remains unchanged for any choice
of η ∈ (0, 1] and ρ ∈ (0,∞).
In the following Lemma, we establish an upper bound on the mean
squared error (MSE) of the TLSE under the RPMP, which we will subse-
quently use to derive our main result.
5This condition is necessary to ensure invertibility of the matrix P2.
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Lemma 3 (Consistency of TLSE). Let r ∈ (0, 1). There exists a finite
positive constant K such that mean-squared parameter estimation error in-
curred under the randomly perturbed perturbed myopic policy (RPMP) (18)-
(19) is upper bounded by
E
γ
[
‖θ̂t − θ‖2
]
≤ K log(t)
t1−r
for all t ≥ 3.
This characterization of mean-squared parameter estimation error will play
a central role in the proof of Theorem 1, which establishes an O(log(T )T r ∨
T 1−r) upper bound on the T -period regret incurred by the randomly per-
turbed myopic policy.
Ultimately, the parameter r must be designed to balance a delicate trade-
off between exploration and exploitation. On the one hand, the probability
that a perturbation occurs should decay at a rate that is slow enough to
generate sufficient price dispersion necessary to ensure consistent parameter
estimation (cf. Lemma 3). On the other hand, this perturbation probability
should decay at a rate that is fast enough to ensure that the (deliberate)
pricing errors do not accumulate too rapidly. In Theorem 1, we establish an
upper bound on the T -period regret that captures this tradeoff, and show
that a perturbation probability P{ξt = 1} = O(t−1/2) (i.e., r = 1/2) is ‘opti-
mal’ in the sense that it minimizes the asymptotic order of our upper bound
on regret up to a multiplicative logarithmic factor.
4.3. A Bound on Regret
In what follows, we establish an upper bound on the T -period regret
incurred by the randomly perturbed myopic policy. As part of our main
result in Theorem 1, we also characterize the optimal ‘decay rate’ for the
perturbation probability.
Theorem 1 (Sub-linear Regret). Let r ∈ (0, 1). There exist finite posi-
tive constants C0, C1, and C2 such that the T -period regret incurred under
the randomly perturbed myopic policy (18)-(19) is upper bounded by
∆γ(T ) ≤ C0 + C1 log(T ) +
(
C2
1− r
)
T 1−r +
(
C2
r
)
log(T )T r
for all T ≥ 3.
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The structure of the upper bound on regret in Theorem 1 reveals an ex-
plicit exploration-exploitation trade-off in choosing the dispersion parameter
r. Specifically, the O(log(T )T r) term captures the component of revenue loss
driven by the parameter estimation error; and the O(T 1−r) term captures the
component of revenue loss driven by the deliberate pricing errors that are in-
curred when price perturbations are applied. A smaller (larger) value of the
dispersion parameter r implies a greater tendency towards exploration (ex-
ploitation) in pricing under the RPMP. Clearly, this exploration-exploitation
trade-off is balanced by setting the dispersion parameter to r = 1/2, as this
value minimizes the asymptotic order of our upper bound on regret (up to a
multiplicative logarithmic factor), yielding
∆γ(T ) ≤ O(log(T )
√
T ).
We note that as part of the proof of Theorem 1, we also show that the
posted price sequence {pt} and contract sequence {Qt} generated by the
randomly perturbed myopic policy converge in the mean square sense to the
oracle optimal price sequence {p∗t} and contract sequence {Q∗t}, respectively.
It is also worth noting that Chen et al. [36] consider a related setting, which
entails the online control of a dynamic inventory system through pricing
and ordering decisions. They consider a different class of policy designs,
and establish an O(
√
T ) upper bound on the order of regret for the class of
policies they consider.
5. Numerical Case Study
We compare the performance of the myopic policy (MP) against the ran-
domly perturbed myopic policy (RPMP) over a time horizon of T = 2500
periods. We set the tuning parameters of the RPMP as η = 0.2, ρ = 0.08,
and r = 0.5. This choice of ρ amounts to increasing the average DR price
offered to customers by eight cents anytime a perturbation is applied. We
assume that there are N = 104 customers participating in the DR program.
For each customer i, we select ai uniformly at random from the interval
[0.04, 0.20], and independently select bi according to an exponential distribu-
tion (with mean equal to 0.01) truncated over the interval [0, 0.1]. This range
of parameter values is consistent with the range of demand price elasticities
observed in several real-time pricing programs operated in the United States
[37, 38]. We further assume that the idiosyncratic demand parameters are
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drawn independently across customers. For each customer i, we let the de-
mand shock have a zero-mean normal distribution with standard deviation
equal to 0.5, truncated over the interval [−2, 2]. We set the DA energy price,
the mean RT shortage price, and the mean RT overage price to pit = 0.5 (for
all t), µ− = 1.7, and µ+ = 0.2 ($/kWh), respectively. We initialize both the
MP and the RPMP with a choice of prices and contracts for periods one and
two p1 = 0, Q1 = 0, p2 = 0.25, and Q2 = 0, respectively. Finally, we estimate
the empirical means and confidence intervals associated with price, contract,
and parameter estimate trajectories using 100 independent realizations of the
experiment.
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Figure 1: Figures in the first column include plots of sample paths generated by the
randomly perturbed myopic policy (RPMP) ( ), the myopic policy (MP) ( ), and
the oracle optimal policy ( ). Figures in the second and third columns include
mean/confidence-interval plots associated with sequences generated by the RPMP (sec-
ond column) and the MP (third column), compared against their oracle optimal policy
counterparts. The shaded area represents their middle 70% empirical confidence interval
estimated using 100 independent experiments.
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Figure 2: A plot of the T -period regret incurred by the randomly perturbed myopic policy
( ) compared to the T -period regret incurred by the myopic policy ( ).
5.1. Discussion
The plots in Figure 1(c) illustrate an apparent lack of exploration in the
sequence of posted prices generated by the myopic policy. That is to say, the
myopic price sequence rapidly converges to a fixed value, which on average
differs substantially from the oracle optimal price. The same is true for the
sequence of forward contracts generated by the myopic policy. The prema-
ture convergence of the myopic price sequence, in turn, leads to incomplete
learning with the parameter estimates converging incorrect values. As a con-
sequence, the T -period regret incurred by the myopic policy grows linearly
in T , as shown in Figure 2.
On the other hand, the persistent variation in the sequence of prices
generated by the randomly perturbed myopic policy induces parameter es-
timates, which asymptotically converge to the true parameter values, which
can be seen from the plots in Figure 1(b). In particular, notice that the
(middle 70%) empirical confidence intervals associated with the posted price
and contract sequences generated by the randomly perturbed myopic policy
shrink to their respective optimal oracle values over time. This provides em-
pirical evidence supporting our theoretical claim that the sequences of prices
and contracts generated by the randomly perturbed myopic policy converge
to their oracle optimal values in the mean square sense.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the problem of co-optimizing an aggregator’s
procurement and sale of demand response. The aggregator purchases en-
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ergy in the form of demand reductions from a fixed group of residential
customers, and sells the (a priori uncertain) aggregate demand reduction in
a two-settlement wholesale electricity market. The customers’ aggregate de-
mand function is assumed to be affine in price (with unknown parameters)
and subject to unobservable, additive random shocks (with unknown distri-
bution). We propose a data-driven policy—referred to as the randomly per-
turbed myopic policy—to guide the aggregator’s adaptation of its posted DR
prices and forward contract offerings over time. We show that the proposed
policy is consistent, meaning that the sequences of prices and contracts that
it generates converge to the oracle optimal price and contract in the mean
square sense. Moreover, we show that the regret incurred by the proposed
policy over T time periods is no more than O(log(T )
√
T ).
As a direction for future research, it would be interesting to generalize
the techniques developed in this paper to accommodate time-varying and
possibly nonlinear demand functions.
References
[1] K. Khezeli, W. Lin, E. Bitar, Learning to buy (and sell) demand re-
sponse, IFAC-PapersOnLine 50 (1) (2017) 6761 – 6767, 20th IFACWorld
Congress. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2017.08.1193.
[2] FERC, Order 719, Wholesale competition in regions with organized elec-
tric markets, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
[3] E. Bitar, Y. Xu, Deadline differentiated pricing of deferrable electric
loads, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 8 (1) (2017) 13–25.
[4] H.-p. Chao, R. Wilson, Priority service: Pricing, investment, and market
organization, The American Economic Review (1987) 899–916.
[5] C. Chen, J. Wang, S. Kishore, A distributed direct load control approach
for large-scale residential demand response, IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems 29 (5) (2014) 2219–2228.
[6] T. Ericson, Direct load control of residential water heaters, Energy Pol-
icy 37 (9) (2009) 3502–3512.
[7] J. Iria, F. Soares, M. Matos, Optimal supply and demand bid-
ding strategy for an aggregator of small prosumers, Applied En-
ergydoi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.09.002.
22
[8] S. Kundu, N. Sinitsyn, S. Backhaus, I. Hiskens, Modeling and control
of thermostatically controlled loads, arXiv preprint arXiv:1101.2157.
[9] J. L. Mathieu, M. Kamgarpour, J. Lygeros, G. Andersson, D. S. Call-
away, Arbitraging intraday wholesale energy market prices with aggrega-
tions of thermostatic loads, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 30 (2)
(2015) 763–772.
[10] A. Nayyar, M. Negrete-Pincetic, K. Poolla, P. Varaiya, Duration-
differentiated energy services with a continuum of loads, IEEE Transac-
tions on Control of Network Systems 3 (2) (2016) 182–191.
[11] G. Sharma, L. Xie, P. Kumar, Large population optimal demand re-
sponse for thermostatically controlled inertial loads, in: Smart Grid
Communications (SmartGridComm), 2013 IEEE International Confer-
ence on, IEEE, 2013, pp. 259–264.
[12] C.-W. Tan, P. Varaiya, Interruptible electric power service contracts,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 17 (3) (1993) 495–517.
[13] Y. Xu, N. Li, S. H. Low, Demand response with capacity constrained
supply function bidding, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 31 (2)
(2016) 1377–1394.
[14] S. Borenstein, M. Jaske, A. Ros, Dynamic pricing, advanced metering,
and demand response in electricity markets, Journal of the American
Chemical Society 128 (12) (2002) 4136–45.
[15] L. Gan, U. Topcu, S. H. Low, Optimal decentralized protocol for electric
vehicle charging, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 28 (2) (2013)
940–951.
[16] L. Jia, L. Tong, Q. Zhao, An online learning approach to dynamic pricing
for demand response, arXiv preprint arXiv:1404.1325.
[17] S. Li, W. Zhang, J. Lian, K. Kalsi, Market-based coordination of ther-
mostatically controlled loads – part I: A mechanism design formulation,
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 31 (2) (2016) 1170–1178.
[18] N. Li, L. Chen, S. H. Low, Optimal demand response based on utility
maximization in power networks, in: Power and Energy Society General
Meeting, 2011 IEEE, IEEE, 2011, pp. 1–8.
23
[19] Z. Ma, D. S. Callaway, I. A. Hiskens, Decentralized charging control
of large populations of plug-in electric vehicles, IEEE Transactions on
Control Systems Technology 21 (1) (2013) 67–78.
[20] P. Samadi, A.-H. Mohsenian-Rad, R. Schober, V. W. Wong, J. Jatske-
vich, Optimal real-time pricing algorithm based on utility maximization
for smart grid, in: Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm),
2010 First IEEE International Conference on, IEEE, 2010, pp. 415–420.
[21] P. Yang, G. Tang, A. Nehorai, A game-theoretic approach for opti-
mal time-of-use electricity pricing, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
28 (2) (2013) 884–892.
[22] C. Campaigne, S. S. Oren, Firming renewable power with demand re-
sponse: an end-to-end aggregator business model, Journal of Regulatory
Economics (2015) 1–37.
[23] H.-p. Chao, Competitive electricity markets with consumer subscription
service in a smart grid, Journal of Regulatory Economics 41 (1) (2012)
155–180.
[24] C. Crampes, T.-O. Le´autier, Demand response in adjustment markets
for electricity, Journal of Regulatory Economics 48 (2) (2015) 169–193.
[25] J. Levin, L. Einav, C. Farronato, N. Sundaresan, Auctions ver-
sus posted prices in online markets, Journal of Political Econ-
omydoi:10.1086/695529.
[26] H.-p. Chao, Demand response in wholesale electricity markets: the
choice of customer baseline, Journal of Regulatory Economics 39 (1)
(2011) 68–88.
[27] C. Chelmis, M. R. Saeed, M. Frincu, V. Prasanna, Curtailment esti-
mation methods for demand response: Lessons learned by comparing
apples to oranges, in: Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Sixth International
Conference on Future Energy Systems, ACM, 2015, pp. 217–218.
[28] K. Coughlin, M. A. Piette, C. Goldman, S. Kiliccote, Statistical anal-
ysis of baseline load models for non-residential buildings, Energy and
Buildings 41 (4) (2009) 374–381.
24
[29] W. Ma, S. Fang, G. Liu, R. Zhou, Modeling of district load forecasting
for distributed energy system, Applied Energy 204 (2017) 181–205.
[30] A. Dvoretzky, J. Kiefer, J. Wolfowitz, Asymptotic minimax character of
the sample distribution function and of the classical multinomial esti-
mator, The Annals of Mathematical Statistics (1956) 642–669.
[31] V. Borkar, P. Varaiya, Identification and adaptive control of markov
chains, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 20 (4) (1982) 470–
489.
[32] P. R. Kumar, P. Varaiya, Stochastic systems: Estimation, identification,
and adaptive control, SIAM, 2015.
[33] T. Lai, H. Robbins, Iterated least squares in multiperiod control, Ad-
vances in Applied Mathematics 3 (1) (1982) 50–73.
[34] A. V. den Boer, B. Zwart, Simultaneously learning and optimizing using
controlled variance pricing, Management science 60 (3) (2013) 770–783.
[35] N. B. Keskin, A. Zeevi, Dynamic pricing with an unknown demand
model: Asymptotically optimal semi-myopic policies, Operations Re-
search 62 (5) (2014) 1142–1167.
[36] B. Chen, X. Chao, H.-S. Ahn, Coordinating pricing and inventory re-
plenishment with nonparametric demand learning, Available at SSRN
2694633.
[37] DoE, Benefits of demand response in electricity markets and recommen-
dations for achieving them, US Dept. Energy, Washington, DC, USA,
Tech. Rep.
[38] A. Faruqui, S. Sergici, Household response to dynamic pricing of elec-
tricity: a survey of 15 experiments, Journal of Regulatory Economics
38 (2) (2010) 193–225.
[39] T. L. Lai, C. Z. Wei, Least squares estimates in stochastic regression
models with applications to identification and control of dynamic sys-
tems, The Annals of Statistics (1982) 154–166.
25
Appendices
A. Notation
Notation Definition
pt DR price offered at time period t
Qt Forward contract commitment at time period t
pit DA energy price at time period t
pi+t RT overage price at time period t
pi−t RT shortage price at time period t
µ+ Expected value of the RT overage price at time period t
µ− Expected value of the RT shortage price at time period t
Dt Aggregate demand reduction at time period t
εt Aggregate demand shock at time period t
F (·) Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the aggregate
demand shock εt at each time period t
θ Demand model parameters (a, b)
rt(Q, p) Expected profit of the aggregator at time period t
∆γ(T ) T -period regret incurred under feasible policy γ
Table 2: Table of notations.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
Given a fixed pair (Q, p), we have that
rt(Q, p) =pitQ− (ap2 + pb) + µ+E [ap+ b−Q+ εt]+
− µ−E [Q− (ap+ b)− εt]+ .
It is straightforward to show that rt(Q, p) is strictly concave in its arguments.
It follows that one can characterize its unique maximizers as solutions to the
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first order optimality conditions:
∂rt(Q, p)
∂p
= −2ap− b+ aµ+(1− F (Q− ap− b)) + aµ−F (Q− ap− b) = 0,
(20)
∂rt(Q, p)
∂Q
= pit − µ+(1− F (Q− ap− b))− µ−F (Q− ap− b) = 0. (21)
The desired result follows.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
Let t ≥ 1, and fix (Qt, pt). To streamline the proof, we define Yt :=
Qt− apt− b for each time period t. It follows that the expected profit of the
aggregator can be expressed as
rt(Qt, pt) = pitYt + E
[
µ+[εt − Yt]+ − µ−[Yt − εt]+
]
+ (pit − pt)(apt + b).
It will be helpful to decompose the expected profit as rt(Qt, pt) = r1t(Qt, pt)+
r2t(Qt, pt), where
r1t(Qt, pt) := pitYt + E
[
µ+[εt − Yt]+ − µ−[Yt − εt]+
]
,
r2t(Qt, pt) := (pit − pt)(apt + b).
It is straightforward to show that
r2t(Q
∗
t , p
∗
t )− r2t(Qt, pt) = a(pt − p∗t )2. (22)
Now we show that for each time period t, we have
r1t(Q
∗
t , p
∗
t )− r1t(Qt, pt) ≤ L(µ− − µ+)(Yt − Y ∗t )2, (23)
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where Y ∗t := Q
∗
t − ap∗t − b. It is straightforward to show that Y ∗t = F−1(αt).
Consider first the case in which Yt ≥ Y ∗t . It follows that
r1t(Q
∗
t , p
∗
t )− r1t(Qt, pt)
= pit(Y
∗
t − Yt) + µ+
∫
∞
Y ∗
t
(εt − Y ∗t ) dF − µ+
∫
∞
Yt
(εt − Yt) dF
− µ−
∫ Y ∗
t
−∞
(Y ∗t − εt) dF + µ−
∫ Yt
−∞
(Yt − εt) dF
= pit(Y
∗
t − Yt) + µ+
∫
∞
Y ∗
t
(Yt − Y ∗t ) dF + µ−
∫ Y ∗
t
−∞
(Yt − Y ∗t ) dF
+ (µ− − µ+)
∫ Yt
Y ∗
t
(Yt − εt) dF
= (Y ∗t − Yt)
(
pit − µ+(1− F (Y ∗t ))− µ−F (Y ∗t )
)
+ (µ− − µ+)
∫ Yt
Y ∗
t
(Yt − εt) dF
= (µ− − µ+)
∫ Yt
Y ∗
t
(Yt − εt) dF,
where the last equality follows from the fact that F (Y ∗t ) = F (F
−1(αt)) = αt.
Now, using the fact that F is bi-Lipschitz, we obtain
r1t(Q
∗
t , p
∗
t )− r1t(Qt, pt) = (µ− − µ+)
∫ Yt
Y ∗
t
(Yt − εt) dF
≤ (µ− − µ+)(Yt − Y ∗t )
∫ Yt
Y ∗
t
dF
≤ L(µ− − µ+)(Yt − Y ∗t )2.
For the case in which Yt < Y
∗
t , one can obtain an identical upper bound
using an analogous approach as above. Finally, combining Inequality (23)
and Equation (22) with the fact that Yt − Y ∗t = Qt −Q∗t − a(pt − p∗t ) yields
the desired upper bound on regret.
D. Proof of Lemma 3
To simplify the presentation in the sequel, we define ut and Ut as follows
ut :=
t∑
k=1
[
pk
1
]
εk and Ut := u
⊤
t P
−1
t ut.
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Recall from Equation (10) that θt − θ = P−1t ut. Then,
E
γ
[
‖θ̂t − θ‖2
]
≤ Eγ [‖P−1t ut‖2] ≤ Eγ [‖P−1/2t ‖2‖P−1/2t ut‖2] ,
where the last inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Using
the definition of matrix norms, it holds that
‖P−1/2t ‖2 =
(
λmax
(
P
−1/2
t
))2
= λmin(Pt)
−1,
where λmax(A) and λmin(A) are defined as the largest and smallest eigenval-
ues of the matrix A, respectively. We construct a lower bound on λmin(Pt)
similar to [34, Lemma 1]. To bound λmin(Pt), we first find the characteristic
polynomial of Pt. Recall the definition of Pt, that is
Pt =
t∑
k=1
[
pk
1
] [
pk
1
]⊤
=
[∑t
k=1 p
2
k
∑t
k=1 pk∑t
k=1 pk t
]
=
[∑t
k=1 p
2
k tp¯t
tp¯t t
]
.
The characteristic polynomial of Pt is given by
λ2 − λ
(
t+
t∑
k=1
p2k
)
+ t2Vt = 0. (24)
From Equation (24) it follows that
λmax(Pt) + λmin(Pt) = t +
t∑
k=1
p2k, (25)
λmax(Pt)λmin(Pt) = t
2Vt. (26)
Define p as p := µ−/2 + ρ, which upper bounds prices generated under the
RPMP policy. From Equation 25 it follows that λmax(Pt) ≤ (1 + p2)t. Thus,
using Equation 26, we get
λmin(Pt) ≥ tVt
1 + p2
.
Using the lower bound on the minimum eigenvalue of Pt and the definition
of Ut, we get
E
γ
[
‖θ̂t − θ‖2
]
≤ Eγ
[
λmin(Pt)
−1‖P−1/2t ut‖2
]
≤ (1 + p2)Eγ
[
Ut
tVt
]
. (27)
29
Now we establish a result that lower bounds the price variance Vt by a func-
tion of random variables ξ1, . . . , ξt. Its proof is postponed to Appendix F.
Lemma 4 (Bound on Vt). Under the randomly perturbed myopic policy
(18) and (19), the price variance Vt is lower bounded by
Vt ≥ Ξt
t
almost surely, (28)
for t ≥ 3. Here, Ξt is defined as
Ξt :=
1
2
(p2 − p1)2 + 2
3
ρ2
t∑
k=3
ξk. (29)
By applying Inequality (28) to Inequality (27), we get
E
γ
[
‖θ̂t − θ‖2
]
≤ (1 + p2)Eγ
[
Ut
Ξt
]
. (30)
We now bound Eγ [Ut/Ξt] similar to Lai and Wei [39, Theorem 1]. They
use the extended stochastic Liapounov functions and construct a recursive
bound on Ut. Using a similar argument we construct a recursive bound on
E
γ [Uk/Ξt] for k = 3, . . . , t. The proof of Lemma 5 is postponed to Appendix
G.
Lemma 5. For all t ≥ 3, it holds that
E
γ
[
Ut
Ξt
]
≤ 2σ2Eγ
[
1
Ξt
]
+ σ2
t∑
k=3
E
γ
[
1
Ξt
[
pk
1
]⊤
P−1k
[
pk
1
]]
, (31)
where σ2 := Var(εt) ≤ (ε− ε)2.
Now we upper bound the second term in the right hand side of Inequality
(31). It is straightforward to show that[
pk
1
]⊤
P−1k
[
pk
1
]
=
1
kVk
[
pk
1
]⊤ [
1 −p¯k
−p¯k Vk + p¯2k
] [
pk
1
]
= 1− (k − 1)Vk−1
kVk
+
1
k
.
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Note that for all x > 0, it holds that 1− x ≤ log(1/x). Thus,
t∑
k=3
[
pk
1
]⊤
P−1k
[
pk
1
]
≤
t∑
k=3
(
log
(
kVk
(k − 1)Vk−1
)
+
1
k
)
= log
(
tVt
2V2
)
+
t∑
k=3
1
k
≤ log
(
tVt
2V2
)
+ log(t)
≤ log
(
2p2
(p2 − p1)2
)
+ 2 log(t) almost surely, (32)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Vt ≤ p2 almost surely
and V2 = (1/4)(p2−p1)2. By applying Inequality (32) and (31) to Inequality
(30), we get
E
γ
[
‖θ̂t − θ‖2
]
≤ 2σ2(1 + p2)
(
1 + log
( √
2p
|p2 − p1|
)
+ log(t)
)
E
γ
[
1
Ξt
]
≤ 2σ2(1 + p2)
(
1 +
1
log(3)
log
(
2
√
2p
|p2 − p1|
))
log(t)Eγ
[
1
Ξt
]
, (33)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that log(t)+c ≤ (1+c/ log(3)) log(t)
for t ≥ 3 and all c ≥ 0, and the fact that |p2−p1| ≤ p. Finally, we establish an
upper bound on Eγ [1/Ξt] in Lemma 6, which its proof is given in Appendix
H.
Lemma 6. For t ≥ 3, it holds that
E
γ
[
1
Ξt
]
≤ 3
(p2 − p1)2ηt1−r .
Setting as follows yields the desired result.
K :=
6σ2(1 + p2)
(p2 − p1)2η
(
1 +
1
log(3)
log
(
2
√
2p
|p2 − p1|
))
.
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E. Proof of Theorem 1
We first establish a result that relates pricing and contracting errors under
the RPMP to the parameter estimation error. Its proof is postponed to
Appendix I.
Lemma 7. Under the randomly perturbed myopic policy (18) and (19), it
holds that
E
γ
[
(pt − p∗t )2
] ≤ k1Eγ [‖θ̂t−1 − θ‖2]+ k2t−r, (34)
and
E
γ
[
(Qt −Q∗t − a(pt − p∗t ))2
]
(35)
≤ k3Eγ
[
‖θ̂t−1 − θ‖2
]
+ k4
1
t− 1 + k5
1√
t− 1 + k6t
−r, (36)
for all t ≥ 3.
We combine Lemmas 2 and 7 to obtain
∆γ(T ) ≤k0 + (k1 + k3L(µ− − µ+))
T∑
t=3
E
γ
[
‖θ̂t−1 − θ‖21
]
+
T∑
t=3
(k2 + k6L(µ
− − µ+))t−r + L(µ− − µ+)
(
k4
1
t− 1 + k5
1√
t− 1
)
≤k0 + (k1 + k3L(µ− − µ+))
T∑
t=2
E
γ
[
‖θ̂t − θ‖21
]
+ (k2 + k6L(µ
− − µ+))
T∑
t=3
t−r + L(µ− − µ+)
T∑
t=2
(
k4
1
t
+ k5
1√
t
)
,
(37)
where k0 :=
∑2
t=1 a(pt − p∗t )2 + L(µ− − µ+)(Qt − Q∗t − a(pt − p∗)2). Now
by applying the bound on the parameter estimation error in Lemma 3 to
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Inequality (37), we get
∆γ(T ) ≤k0 + (k1 + k3L(µ− − µ+))K
T∑
t=2
log(t)
t1−r
+ (k2 + k6L(µ
− − µ+))
T∑
t=3
t−r + L(µ− − µ+)
T∑
t=2
(
k4
1
t
+ k5
1√
t
)
≤k0 + (k1 + k3L(µ− − µ+))K log(T )
r
T r +
k2 + k6L(µ
− − µ+)
1− r T
1−r
+ L(µ− − µ+)
(
k4 log(T ) + 2k5
√
T
)
≤C0 + C1 log(T ) +
(
C2
1− r
)
T 1−r +
(
C2
r
)
log(T )T r.
The second inequality follows from the fact that for r ∈ (0, 1), we have that
T∑
t=2
log(t)
t1−r
≤
∫ T
1
log(x)
x1−r
dx ≤ 1
r
log(T )T r,
and
T∑
t=3
t−r ≤
∫ T
2
x−rdx ≤ 1
1− rT
1−r,
and that
T∑
t=2
1
t
≤
∫ T
1
1
x
dx = log(T ).
We complete the proof by defining the constants C0, C1, and C2 as follows.
C0 := k0,
C1 := L(µ
− − µ+)k4,
C2 := 2L(µ
− − µ+)k5 +max
{
k2 + k6L(µ
− − µ+), (k1 + k3L(µ− − µ+))K
}
.
F. Proof of Lemma 4
It is straightforward to show that
t∑
k=1
(pk − p¯t)2 =
t∑
k=2
k − 1
k
(pk − p¯k−1)2.
33
Then for the RPMP, we get
tVt =
t∑
k=2
k − 1
k
(pk − p¯k−1)2
=
1
2
(p2 − p1)2 +
t∑
k=3
k − 1
k
(pk − p¯k−1)2
=
1
2
(p2 − p1)2 +
t∑
k=3
k − 1
k
(ρξk + (p̂k − p¯k−1)(1− ξk))2
=
1
2
(p2 − p1)2 +
t∑
k=3
k − 1
k
ρ2ξ2k +
t∑
k=3
k − 1
k
(p̂k − p¯k−1)2(1− ξk)2,
where the last equality follows from the fact that ξk(1− ξk) = 0 for all k ≥ 3.
Thus, almost surely it holds that
tVt ≥ 1
2
(p2 − p1)2 +
t∑
k=3
k − 1
k
ρ2ξ2k
≥ 1
2
(p2 − p1)2 + 2
3
ρ2
t∑
k=3
ξ2k
=
1
2
(p2 − p1)2 + 2
3
ρ2
t∑
k=3
ξk,
where the last equality follows from the fact that ξk only takes values in
{0, 1}.
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G. Proof of Lemma 5
Recall from the definition of Ξt in Equation (29) that it is only a function
of ξ3, . . . , ξt. Thus εk is independent of Ξt for all k = 1, . . . , t. Then,
E
γ
[
Uk
Ξt
]
= Eγ
[
1
Ξt
(
uk−1 +
[
pk
1
]
εk
)⊤
P−1k
(
uk−1 +
[
pk
1
]
εk
)]
= Eγ
[
1
Ξt
u⊤k−1P
−1
k uk−1
]
+ 2Eγ
[
1
Ξt
u⊤k−1P
−1
k
[
pk
1
]
εk
]
+ Eγ
[
1
Ξt
[
pk
1
]⊤
P−1k
[
pk
1
]
ε2k
]
= Eγ
[
1
Ξt
u⊤k−1P
−1
k uk−1
]
+ 2Eγ
[
1
Ξt
u⊤k−1P
−1
k
[
pk
1
]
E
γ
[
εk
∣∣∣ Ξt, p1, . . . , pk, ε1, . . . , εk−1]]
+ Eγ
[
1
Ξt
[
pk
1
]⊤
P−1k
[
pk
1
]
E
γ
[
ε2k
∣∣∣ Ξt, p1, . . . , pk, ε1, . . . , εk−1]
]
= Eγ
[
1
Ξt
u⊤k−1P
−1
k uk−1
]
+ σ2Eγ
[
1
Ξt
[
pk
1
]⊤
P−1k
[
pk
1
]]
, (38)
where the third equality is a direct application of the law of iterated expecta-
tions. The last equality follows from the fact that Eγ [εk|Ξt, p1, . . . , pk, ε1, . . . , εk−1] =
0 and Eγ [ε2k|Ξt, p1, . . . , pk, ε1, . . . , εk−1] = Var(εk) = σ2. Using Sherman-
Morrison formula we get
P−1k =
(
Pk−1 +
[
pk
1
] [
pk
1
]⊤)−1
= P−1k−1 −
P−1k−1
[
pk
1
] [
pk
1
]⊤
P−1k−1
1 +
[
pk
1
]⊤
P−1k−1
[
pk
1
] .
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It follows that,
E
γ
[
1
Ξt
u⊤k−1P
−1
k uk−1
]
= Eγ
[
Uk−1
Ξt
]
− Eγ
 1Ξt
(
uk−1P
−1
k−1
[
pk
1
])2
1 +
[
pk
1
]⊤
P−1k−1
[
pk
1
]

≤ Eγ
[
Uk−1
Ξt
]
,
where the inequality follows from the fact that the random variable in the
second expectation is non-negative almost surely. By applying the above
inequality to Inequality (38), we get
E
γ
[
Uk
Ξt
]
− Eγ
[
Uk−1
Ξt
]
≤ σ2Eγ
[
1
Ξt
[
pk
1
]⊤
P−1k
[
pk
1
]]
.
By summing the two sides of the above inequality, we get
E
γ
[
Ut
Ξt
]
≤ E
[
U2
Ξt
]
+ σ2
t∑
k=3
E
γ
[
1
Ξt
[
pk
1
]⊤
P−1k
[
pk
1
]]
.
To compute the first term in the above inequality we compute U2. Recall
that p1 and p2 are deterministic constants. Then,
U2 =
1
(p2 − p1)2
[
p1ε1 + p2ε2
ε1 + ε2
]⊤ [
2 −(p1 + p2)
−(p1 + p2) p21 + p22
] [
p1ε1 + p2ε2
ε1 + ε2
]
=
1
p2 − p1
[
p1ε1 + p2ε2
ε1 + ε2
]⊤ [ −ε1 + ε2
p2ε1 − p1ε2
]
= ε21 + ε
2
2.
The desired inequality follows from independence of ε1 and ε2 from Ξt.
H. Proof of Lemma 6
LetXk ∼ Ber(pk) and Yk ∼ Ber(qk) be sequences of independent Bernoulli
random variables such that pk ≥ qk for all k = 1, . . . , t. Then, for all c > 0
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and all t ≥ 1 using the law of iterated expectations we get
E
[
1
c +
∑t
k=1Xk
]
= (1− pt)E
[
1
c+
∑t−1
k=1Xk
]
+ ptE
[
1
c+ 1 +
∑t−1
k=1Xk
]
= Eγ
[
1
c+
∑t−1
k=1Xk
]
− ptE
[
1(
c+
∑t−1
k=1Xk
) (
1 + c +
∑t−1
k=1Xk
)]
Using the fact that pt ≥ qt, we get
E
[
1
c+
∑t
k=1Xk
]
≤ E
[
1
c+
∑t−1
k=1Xk
]
− qtE
[
1(
c+
∑t−1
k=1Xk
) (
1 + c+
∑t−1
k=1Xk
)]
= E
[
1
c +
∑t−1
k=1Xk + Yt
]
.
Using a similar argument, one can show that for all τ = 1, . . . , t, it holds
that
E
[
1
c+
∑τ
k=1Xk +
∑t
k=τ+1 Yk
]
≤ E
[
1
c+
∑τ−1
k=1Xk +
∑t
k=τ Yk
]
.
By taking the sum of the both sides of the above inequality from τ = 1 to
τ = t, we get
E
[
1
c+
∑t
k=1Xk
]
≤ E
[
1
c+
∑t
k=1 Yk
]
.
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Now let qk = q for all k = 1, . . . , t. It follows that in this case
∑t
k=1 Yk is a
Binomial random variable with parameters (t, q). Then
E
[
1
c+
∑t
k=1 Yk
]
=
t∑
k=0
1
c+ k
(
t
k
)
qk(1− q)t−k
=
t∑
k=0
1 + k
c + k
1
1 + k
(
t
k
)
qk(1− q)t−k
≤ 1
c
t∑
k=0
1
1 + k
(
t
k
)
qk(1− q)t−k
=
1
c(t+ 1)q
t∑
k=0
(
t + 1
k + 1
)
qk+1(1− q)t−k
=
1
c(t+ 1)q
(
1− (1− q)t+1) .
Thus,
E
[
1
c+
∑t
k=1 Yk
]
≤ 1
c(t + 1)q
.
It follows from the above that for all t ≥ 3
E
[
1
c+
∑t
k=3 Yk
]
≤ 1
c(t− 1)q ≤
3
2ctq
.
Using the fact that ηk−r ≥ ηt−r for k = 3, . . . , t, and by setting q = ηt−r we
get
E
γ
[
1
Ξt
]
=
3
2ρ2
E
γ
[
1
3(p2 − p1)2/(4ρ2) +
∑t
k=3 ξk
]
≤ 3
(p2 − p1)2ηt1−r .
I. Proof of Lemma 7
Using the fact that ξt(1− ξt) = 0 for all t ≥ 3, we obtain
E
γ
[
(pt − p∗t )2
]
= Eγ
[
((p̂t − p∗t )(1− ξt) + (p¯t−1 − p∗t + ρ)ξt)2
]
= Eγ
[
(p̂t − p∗t )2
]
E
[
(1− ξt)2
]
+ Eγ
[
(p¯t−1 − p∗t + ρ)2
]
E
[
ξ2t
]
= Eγ
[
(p̂t − p∗t )2
]
(1− ηt−r) + Eγ [(p¯t−1 − p∗t + ρ)2] ηt−r
≤ Eγ [(p̂t − p∗t )2]+ Eγ [(p¯t−1 − p∗t + ρ)2] ηt−r.
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The second equality follows from the fact that ξt is independent from p̂t and
p¯t−1. Using Equation (17), it is not difficult to show that
p̂t − p∗t =
1
2aât
[
b
−a
]⊤
(θ̂t − θ).
Then,
|p̂t − p∗t | ≤
√
a2 + b2
2aa
‖θ̂t − θ‖.
Using the above inequality, and the fact that |p¯t−1 − p∗t + ρ| ≤ p + ρ for all
t ≥ 3, we obtain
E
γ
[
(pt − p∗t )2
] ≤ k1Eγ [‖θ̂t−1 − θ‖2]+ k2t−r,
where
k1 :=
a2 + b2
4a2a2
and k2 := (p+ ρ)
2η.
Under the randomly perturbed myopic policy for t ≥ 3, using the law of total
expectation we get
E
γ
[
(Qt −Q∗t − a(pt − p∗t ))2
]
= (1− ηt−r)Eγ
[
(Q̂t −Q∗t − a(p̂t − p∗t ))2
]
+ ηt−rEγ
[
(Q̂t −Q∗t − a(p¯t−1 − p∗t + ρ))2
]
≤ Eγ
[
(Q̂t −Q∗t − a(p̂t − p∗t ))2
]
+ k6t
−r, (39)
where k6 is defined as
k6 := η
(
1
2
(µ−a+ b− b) + (ε− ε) + ap
)2
.
For the first term in Inequality (39), using the fact that Q̂t = âtp̂t + b̂t +
F̂−1t (αt) we get
Q̂t −Q∗t − a(p̂t − p∗t ) = (ât−1 − a)p̂t + (̂bt−1 − b) + F̂−1t−1(αt)− F−1(αt)
=
[
p̂t
1
]⊤
(θ̂t−1 − θ) + F̂−1t−1(αt)− F−1(αt),
39
Thus,
E
γ
[
(Q̂t −Q∗t − a(p̂t − p∗t ))2
]
= Eγ
([p̂t
1
]⊤
(θ̂t−1 − θ) + F̂−1t−1(αt)− F−1(αt)
)2
≤ Eγ
[(
2
√
1 + p2‖θ̂t−1 − θ‖ + |F−1t−1(αt)− F−1(αt)|
)2]
.
The inequality follows from Inequality (14). Recall that θ̂t is the TLSE. Thus,
it holds that ‖θ̂t − θ‖ ≤ δ surely, where δ is defined as δ :=
√
(a− a)2 + b2.
Thus,
E
γ
[
(Q̂t −Q∗t − a(p̂t − p∗t ))2
]
≤ 4(1 + p2)Eγ
[
‖θ̂t−1 − θ‖21
]
+ E
[
(F−1t−1(αt)− F−1(αt))2
]
+ 4δ
√
1 + p2E
[|F−1t−1(αt)− F−1(αt)|] .
To bound the second and the third terms in the right hand side of the above
inequality, we use Inequality (15), and the fact that |F−1t (αt)−F−1(αt)| and
(F−1t (αt)−F−1(αt))2 are non-negative random variables. For t ≥ 2, we have
that
E
[∣∣F−1t (αt)− F−1(αt)∣∣] = ∫ ∞
0
P
{∣∣F−1t (αt)− F−1(αt)∣∣ ≥ δ} dδ
≤
∫
∞
0
2 exp
(−µ1δ2t) dδ
=
√
pi√
µ1t
, (40)
and
E
[(
F−1t (αt)− F−1(αt)
)2]
=
∫
∞
0
P
{∣∣F−1t (αt)− F−1(αt)∣∣ ≥ √δ} dδ
≤
∫
∞
0
2 exp (−µ1δt) dδ
=
2
µ1t
. (41)
40
We conclude the proof by defining the constants k3, k4, and k5 as
k3 := 4(1 + p
2), k4 :=
2
µ1
, and k5 := 4δ
√
pi(1 + p2)√
µ1
.
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